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WALKING ON EGGSHELLS: THE EFFECT OF
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT'S
RULING IN BURLINGTON NOR THERN &
SANTA FE RAIL WAY CO. V. WHITE
Julia S. Lee*
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent history, there has been an increase in the number of
retaliation claims filed by employees who suffer adverse
consequences after bringing Title VII discrimination claims.
Retaliation charges are independent legal claims that do not depend
on the success of the underlying discrimination claim.1 Because
retaliation claims are frequently successful with juries, plaintiffs
often add them to discrimination claims.2 In fact, retaliation claims
filed with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC")3 increased 10 percent during the 1990s.4 Specifically,
Title VII retaliation claims increased from 16,394 (20.3 percent of all
* J.D. Candidate, May 2008, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., Business
Economics, June 2001, University of California, Los Angeles. My warmest gratitude to the
editors and staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for their hard work and editorial
assistance. Special thanks to my family, especially my sisters Katie and Angela, for their
unfailing love and support.
1. Joan M. Savage, Note, Adopting the EEOC Deterrence Approach to the Adverse
Employment Action Prong in a Prima Facie Case for Title VII Retaliation, 46 B.C. L. REV. 215,
219 (2004).
2. Id.
3. The EEOC was created to enforce and coordinate all federal government workplace-
discrimination laws and policies. See U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Overview -
Laws, http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeo/overviewlaws.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2008).
4. See U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Charge Statistics, FY 1997-2007,
http://eeoc.gov/stats/charges.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2008); id., FY 1992-1996,
http://eeoc.gov/stats/charges-a.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2008).
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claims filed) in 1997 to 19,560 (25.8 percent of all claims filed) in
2006. 5
In Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White,6 the
United States Supreme Court held that the Title VII anti-retaliation
provision is not confined to employment- or workplace-related
actions or harms, and it created a material adversity standard to
adjudicate such retaliation claims.7 The Court found that under the
circumstances of the case, a reassignment of duties and a thirty-seven
day suspension without pay met the material adversity standard.8
Since courts had previously differed in their approach to Title VII,
the Court resolved the circuit splits through the decision in
Burlington .'
This Comment addresses the Burlington standard and its
implications. Part II begins by briefly describing the circuit splits
and the various interpretations of Title VII's anti-retaliation
provision prior to Burlington. Part III summarizes the facts,
procedural history, and the Supreme Court's analysis in Burlington.
Part IV argues that instead of delineating a uniform rule for the
courts, the Supreme Court created an ambiguous standard that leaves
courts and employers confused. Part V addresses the harmful and
costly implications of Burlington. Finally, Part VI concludes that the
Supreme Court erred in creating a highly subjective and unclear
standard that broadens the scope of the anti-retaliation provision.
II. HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK:
CONFLICT AMONG THE CIRCUITS
Prior to the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Burlington, the circuits were split regarding the interpretation of Title
VII's anti-retaliation provision and the character and extent of
retaliatory conduct.' The circuits differed on whether the retaliatory
act must be employment or workplace related and whether the
5. Id.
6. 126 S. Ct. 2405 (2006).
7. Id. at 2409.
8. Id. at2418.
9. Id. at 2408.
10. See Scott Rosenberg & Jeffrey Lipman, Developing a Consistent Standard for
Evaluating a Retaliation Case Under Federal and State Civil Rights Statutes and State Common
Law Claims: An Iowa Model for the Nation, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 359, 363-64 (2005).
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magnitude of harm could be a determinative factor." The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the disagreement
between the circuits.'
2
A. Fifth and Eighth Circuits
The Fifth and Eighth Circuits employed a restrictive approach
that used an "ultimate employment decision" test as the standard to
prove a retaliation claim. 3  Under the "ultimate employment
decision" test, an employee was liable for retaliatory conduct only
for acts "such as hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting, and
compensating."' 4  In Harlston v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,5 the
Eighth Circuit held that a secretary's reassignment to a different
position without any reduction in title, salary, or benefits-even
though the new position "involved fewer secretarial duties and was
more stressful"-was not an adverse employment action. 6 Although
the employee suffered a loss of status and prestige, the employee's
reassignment did not satisfy the "ultimate employment decision"
test. 7 Thus, the Fifth and Eighth Circuits' test was more restrictive
and only pertained to cases dealing specifically with employment-
and workplace-related actions.
B. Fourth and Sixth Circuits
While using a broader standard than the Fifth or Eighth Circuits,
the Fourth and Sixth Circuits restricted the challenged conduct to
employment- or workplace-related actions. 8  The Sixth Circuit
adopted a "materially adverse" standard, which required that a
plaintiff show that the employer's action had an adverse effect on the
employment "'terms, conditions, or benefits.""' 9 For example, in
11. Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2410-11.
12. Id. at2411.
13. See Manning v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 127 F.3d 686, 692 (8th Cir. 1997); Rosenberg &
Lipman, supra note 10, at 373.
14. Page v. Bolger, 645 F.2d 227, 233 (4th Cir. 1981).
15. 37 F.3d 379 (8th Cir. 1994).
16. Id. at 382.
17. Id. The court did not use the term "ultimate employment decision" but applied the same
test, finding that the reassignment did not affect her "title, salary, or benefits." Id.
18. See Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2410.
19. Id. (quoting Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 866 (4th Cir. 2001)).
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Munday v. Waste Management of North America, Inc.,2" the Fourth
Circuit court applied this standard and held that the employer did not
act adversely.2' In Munday, the employee alleged that after she
settled her sexual harassment and discrimination claim, her employer
yelled at her and instructed other employees to avoid her and to
report back anything she said.22 The court determined that an
employer's instructions to ignore and spy on another employee did
not constitute an adverse employment action because it did not go to
the "terms, conditions, or benefits of her employment."23 Since the
Fourth and Sixth Circuits incorporated both a materiality standard
and an employment-related requirement, it established an
intermediate threshold. 4
C. Seventh and District of Columbia Circuits
Unlike the Sixth Circuit, which required a materially adverse
change in the terms of employment, the Seventh and District of
Columbia Circuits implemented a broader standard that focused on
the materiality of the challenged action and not on whether the action
was employment related. The Seventh and District of Columbia
Circuits found anti-retaliatory conduct when an employer acted in a
manner that was "material to a reasonable employee."26 The act was
material if it would have "dissuaded a reasonable worker from
making or supporting a charge of discrimination."27 For instance, in
Rochon v. Gonzales,2 the District of Columbia Circuit found the
Federal Bureau of Investigation's ("FBI") refusal to investigate a
death threat against its agent "'material to a reasonable employee."'29
The FBI's inaction might dissuade a reasonable FBI agent from
reporting a discrimination claim against the FBI if he knew he would
be "unprotected by the FBI in the face of threats against him or his
20. 126 F.3d 239 (4th Cir. 1997).
21. Id. at 243.
22. Id. at 241.
23. Id. at 243.
24. See Savage, supra note 1, at 225.
25. Id.
26. Washington v. Il. Dep't of Revenue, 420 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2005).
27. Id.
28. 438 F.3d 1211 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
29. Id. at 1219 (quoting Washington, 420 F.3d at 662).
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family."3  Because this standard was broader and focused on an
objective reasonableness standard, it necessitated a case-by-case
approach.3
D. Ninth Circuit
Similar to the Seventh and District of Columbia Circuits, the
Ninth Circuit endorsed a broad approach to anti-retaliatory conduct.
The Ninth Circuit adopted the EEOC's approach, which states that
Title VII prohibits "adverse treatment that is based on a retaliatory
motive and is reasonably likely to deter the charging party or others
from engaging in protected activity."33  Although it is a broad
standard that "covers lateral transfers, unfavorable job references,
and changes in work schedules," it does not cover "every offensive
utterance."34 This standard focuses more on the deterrent effects and
less on the ultimate effects of each action.35 The Ninth Circuit
applied this standard in Ray v. Henderson and found adverse
employment actions. 6 When the employer eliminated a flexible
start-time policy, enforced lock-down procedures, and
disproportionately reduced the employee's pay and workload, the
court held that these actions were reasonably likely to deter an
employee from filing a discrimination complaint.37 In comparison to
the other circuits, the Ninth Circuit implemented the broadest
standard.
III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. Background and Procedural Facts
In June 1997, Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway
Company ("Burlington"), through its roadmaster 8 Marvin Brown,
30. Id. at 1220.
31. See Savage, supra note 1, at 225.
32. Id.
33. U.S. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 8, at 8-13 (1998),
available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/retal.pdf.
34. Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1243 (9th Cir. 2000).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1244.
37. Id. at 1243-44.
38. A roadmaster is someone who is in charge of the railroad track. See Burlington N. &
Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2409 (2006).
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hired Sheila White as a track laborer and quickly assigned her as a
forklift operator when a position became available.39 White was the
only woman working in the Maintenance of Way department. "0 In
September 1997, White complained to Burlington officials that her
immediate supervisor had made insulting remarks to her and told her
that women should not be working in the Maintenance of Way
department.4' After an investigation, Burlington officials suspended
her supervisor.2
In late September, Brown reassigned White to perform only
track laborer duties.43  He rationalized that "'a more senior man'
should have the 'less arduous and cleaner job' of forklift operator.""
4
In October, White filed a complaint with the EEOC and asserted that
her reassignment was due to unlawful gender discrimination and
retaliation for her earlier complaint.45
In early December, White filed a second retaliation complaint
asserting that Brown monitored her activities through surveillance.46
Brown received a copy of her charge.4 ' A few days later, White and
her immediate supervisor argued over a transport issue and her
supervisor reported her "insubordination" to Brown.48 Brown then
suspended White without compensation. 9 White then pursued
internal grievance procedures, and the company found that she had
not been insubordinate." As a result, Burlington reinstated White
and awarded her back pay for her thirty-seven day suspension.5
White filed another retaliation charge with the EEOC based on the
suspension. 2
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id,
43. Id
44. Id. (citing White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 2002 FED App. 0391P at 21 (6th
Cir.)).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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White subsequently filed a Title VII action against Burlington
for reassigning her to another position and suspending her without
pay for thrity-seven days. 3 The district court found in favor of
White and awarded her $43,500 in compensatory damages, which
included $3,250 in medical expenses. 4
A Sixth Circuit panel reversed the judgment and found in favor
of Burlington.55 The panel decided that the reassignment, which was
to a different position within the same job classification, and the
suspension, which was later compensated with back pay, were not
adverse employment actions.56 However, the full court vacated the
panel's decision and heard the matter en banc,57 ultimately affirming
the district court's judgment.58
B. The Reasoning of the United States Supreme Court
In a unanimous decision,59 the United States Supreme Court held
that Title VII's anti-retaliation provision does not confine the
prohibited actions to employment- or workplace-related
occurrences. 60  Instead, it prohibits employer actions that are
"materially adverse to a reasonable employee or job applicant."'"
Justice Alito concurred with the judgment but disagreed with the
reasoning,6' arguing in favor of the lower court's standard that
restricts anti-retaliation claims to employment-related actions.63
1. Broadening the Anti-Retaliation Provision
By affirming the lower court's decision, the United States
Supreme Court found that Burlington violated Title VII's anti-
retaliation provision.' The Court, however, used a different standard
53. Id. at 2410.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 2002 FED App. 0391P at 21 (6th Cir.).
57. Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2410.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 2408.
60. Id. at 2409.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 2418 (Alito, J., concurring).
63. See id. at 2419 (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 2410 (discussing the lower court's
reasoning).
64. Id. at 2416.
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from the lower court. 65  Rather than using the Sixth Circuit's
restrictive employment-related-conduct rule that defines an adverse
employment action as a "'materially adverse change in the terms and
conditions' of employment, 66 the Court created a broader standard. 6
Specifically, the Court implemented a new standard that does not
limit the anti-retaliation provision to actions "that are related to
employment or occur at the workplace. '6 s
The Court compared the language of Title VII's anti-
discrimination provision with Title VII's anti-retaliation provision.69
Section 703(a) of Title VII, the anti-discrimination provision, states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer--(I) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or
applicants for employment in any way which would deprive
or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin."
By contrast, the anti-retaliation provision in Title VII, section 704(a),
states that "[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants
for employment.. . ."" In the anti-discrimination provision, the
Court found explicit language, such as "'compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment,"' that limits the reach of the
provision to actions that affect employment or the workplace.72
However, in the anti-retaliation provision, the Court found "[n]o
65. Id. at 2414.
66. Id. at 2410 (quoting White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 2004 FED App. 0102P
at 11 (6th Cir.)).
67. Id. at 2414.
68. Id. at 2409.
69. Id. at 2411.
70. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) to (2) (2000)
(emphasis added).
71. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (emphasis added).
72. Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2411-12 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)).
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such limiting words."73  The Court quickly dismissed an in pari
materia argument because of the linguistic differences between the
provisions.74 Instead, the Court focused on the intent of the drafters
and cited Russello v. United States,75 where the Court noted that
"'Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion
or exclusion' of statutory language.76
To ascertain the intent of Congress, the Court looked at
precedent to determine the objectives of the two provisions.77 The
Court found that the anti-discrimination provision aims to prevent
workplace discrimination based on "racial, ethnic, religious, or
gender-based status."78 The Court maintained that the goal of the
anti-retaliation provision is to supplement the anti-discrimination
provision by preventing an employer from retaliating against an
employee who attempts to secure protection under the anti-
discrimination provision.79 The Court also declared that the anti-
retaliation provision's primary purpose was to "'[m]aintain[]
unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms.""'8 The Court
distinguished the two provisions by reasoning that the substantive
anti-discrimination provision prevents injury based on an
individual's status, while the anti-retaliation provision prevents
injury based on an individual's conduct.
81
The Court found that the anti-retaliation provision's objective
could not be secured by limiting actions only to the workplace and
that the language of the provision is comparatively broad.
Accordingly, the Court held that the anti-retaliation provision should
apply to actions and harms outside the realm of employment or the
workplace.82 To support its reasoning, the Court cited Rochon v.
Gonzales,3 where the FBI retaliated against an employee by refusing
73. Id. at 2412.
74. Id. The phrase "in pari materia" translates to "in the same matter." Statutes in pari
materia are to be construed together. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 807 (8th ed. 2004).
75. 464 U.S. 16 (1983).
76. Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2412 (quoting Russello, 464 U.S. at 23).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997)).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 2412-13.
83. 438 F.3d 1211 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
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to investigate death threats against the agent, and Berry v. Stevinson
Chevrolet,84 where an employer filed false criminal charges against
an employee who complained about discrimination. 5  Thus, by
interpreting the statutory language and prior case law, the Court held
that employees can file anti-retaliatory claims that are unrelated to
employment or the workplace.86
2. The Material Adversity and Reasonableness Standard
In reviewing the anti-retaliation provision, the Burlington Court
added another component to its standard-the employer's actions
must be materially adverse to a reasonable employee or applicant."
The Court found that a plaintiff must establish that a reasonable
employee would find the employer's action materially adverse. 8 In
effect, this means that it would have "'dissuaded a reasonable worker
from making or supporting a charge of discrimination."'89
The Court established the material adversity standard to "filter
out complaints attacking 'the ordinary tribulations of the workplace,
such as the sporadic use of abusive language, gender-related jokes,
and occasional teasing."'9 The Court noted that since petty slights
or minor annoyances are ordinary actions, the material adversity
standard would distinguish between egregious and minimal harms.9'
Essentially, since an employer's petty actions would not dissuade an
employee from complaining to the EEOC, this behavior would not
be material under the new standard.
In addition to the material harm standard, the Court
implemented the reasonableness standard because the Court wanted
an objective test by which to judge an employee's harm.93 The Court
argued that an objective standard is judicially administrable and
avoids "uncertainties and unfair discrepancies. '"" The Court noted,
84. 74 F.3d 980 (10th Cir. 1996).
85. Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2412.
86. Id. at 2414.
87. Id. at 2415.
88. Id.
89. Id. (quoting Rochon, 438 F.3d at 1219).
90. Id. (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998)).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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however, that the general reasonableness standard should consider
the particular circumstances of each individual employee.95 The
Court cited Washington v. Illinois Department of Revenue, 96 where a
schedule change was deemed critical to an employee with a disabled
child,97 to demonstrate that context and "'surrounding circumstances,
expectations, and relationships"' are essential to finding
reasonableness.98 The Court further noted that reasonableness "is
tied to the challenged retaliatory act, not the underlying"
discriminatory conduct.9
In applying the new standard, the Court found that Burlington
retaliated against White by reassigning her from a forklift operator to
a track laborer and by giving her a thirty-seven day suspension
without pay.' The reassignment was materially adverse because the
forklift operator position required more qualifications and was more
prestigious."' Thus, a reasonable employee under these particular
circumstances would consider this transfer to a "more arduous and
dirtier" job to be materially adverse.0 2 Moreover, the Court deemed
the thirty-seven day suspension materially adverse since a reasonable
employee would find a month without pay to be a hardship. 3 White
demonstrated this hardship when she obtained treatment for her
emotional distress."° Therefore, the Court held that Burlington
violated Title VII by retaliating against White.0 5
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION
By not reading Title VII sections 703(a) and 704(a) in pari
materia, 106 the Supreme Court erred in its interpretation of Title
95. Id.
96. 420 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2005).
97. Id. at 662.
98. Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2415 (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523
U.S. 75, 81-82 (1998)).
99. Id. at 2416.
100. Id.
101. Id. at2417.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at2416.
106. As Black's explains:
It is a canon of construction that statutes that are in pari materia may be construed
together, so that inconsistencies in one statute may be resolved by looking at another
Winter 2008]
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VII's definition of "to discriminate."'' 7  Instead of harmonizing
sections 703(a) and 704(a), the Court erroneously took a broader
approach and created a new standard that deems retaliatory all acts
which "'dissuade[] a reasonable worker from making or supporting a
charge of discrimination.'""0'
Rather than enact new measures through a single statute, the
Court should consider both "the specific context in which that
language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a
whole."' 9  Accordingly, the Court should follow reasoning
articulated in prior cases, where it emphasized that it should not
"construe statutory phrases in isolation.""' If the Court had followed
this approach, it would have concluded that the context and statutory
language of Title VII sections 703(a) and 704(a) should be
harmonized to restrict retaliatory acts to employment-related
conduct.
The historical development of Title VII makes it clear that the
two sections should be read together. Title VII was enacted as part
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."' During the 1950s and 1960s, the
United States experienced social and racial tension because of the
government's attempts to desegregate schools and increase voting
rights." '2 To clarify the government's position, Congress proposed
statutes that would "eradicate discrimination in voting, public
accommodation, education, and employment.""' 3 Because Congress
passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 quickly, Title VII received little
official attention and therefore lacks an adequate legislative
history." '4 Although the House Judiciary Committee submitted a
statute on the same subject. . .. '[W]hen an earlier statute is in pari materia with a
later one, it is simply part of its context to be considered by the judge in deciding
whether the meaning of a provision in the later statute is plain.'
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 807 (8th ed. 2004) (quoting RUPERT CROSS, STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 128 (1976)).
107. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-3(a), -2(a) (2000).
108. Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2415 (quoting Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 (D.C.
Cir. 2006)).
109. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997).
110. United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 828 (1984).
111. See Eric M.D. Zion, Overcoming Adversity: Distinguishing Retaliation from General
Prohibitions under Federal Employment Discrimination Law, 76 IND. L.J. 191, 197 (2001).
112. See id. at 195.
113. Id.
114. See id. at 197.
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report to Congress, it did not contain any helpful explanation of Title
VII." 5  The lack of legislative guidance places the burden on the
courts to resolve ambiguities in the Act.
When individual sections of a statute have ambiguous legislative
history and address the same subject matter, the sections should be
construed "as if they were one law.""' 6 For instance, in United States
v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 7 the Court read the Clean Water
Act and its amendments in pari materia to interpret the provisions of
the Act."8 Congress usually "uses a particular word with a consistent
meaning in a given context."" 9 This assumes that Congress knew of
the sections, especially if they were enacted at the same time. 2 °
The concept of in pari materia can be applied to Title VII. The
two sections were enacted at the same time by the same Congress.2 '
Since Title VII has little legislative history,'22 however, it is
impossible to find a reliable interpretation of sections 703(a) and
704(a). Despite this lack of legislative guidance, it is nonetheless
clear that Congress intended that Title VII eradicate discrimination
on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."23
Section 703(a) furthered that intent when it made it unlawful to
discriminate "against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment...
,14 Similarly, section 704(a) addressed the anti-retaliatory behavior
and made it unlawful "for an employer to discriminate against any of
his employees or applicants for employment .... i25
Unlike section 703(a), however, section 704(a) contains the
ambiguous phrase "to discriminate." "To discriminate" can be
broadly interpreted to mean any acts, either employment or
115. Id. at 196.
116. Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239, 243 (1972) (internal citations omitted).
117. 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
118. Id. at 138-39 (noting that the term "waters" does not exclude "wetlands" since other
sections of the Act use the term "navigable waters").
119. Erlenbaugh, 409 U.S. at 243.
120. Id. at 244.
121. See EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES
VII AND XI OF CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 8-11 (1968).
122. Zion, supra note 111, at 197.
123. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).
124. Id.
125. Id. § 2000e-3(a)
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nonemployment related, or it can be narrowly interpreted to mean
acts strictly relating to employment. 2 6 By applying in pari materia,
sections 703(a) and 704(a) should be construed "as if they were one
law."' 21 Section 703(a) relates specifically to employment- and
workplace-related acts, such as "compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment."'2 8 Thus, by reading the sections together,
section 704(a) should also relate to employment- and workplace-
related actions. Congress merely used "to discriminate" as a
shorthand version and continuation of section 703(a), not as a
purposeful means of distinguishing the two sections. Moreover,
there is no express limitation to prevent the Court from interpreting
the statutes in pari materia. Therefore, the Court should have
narrowly interpreted section 703(a) and restricted the anti-retaliation
provision to employment-related acts.
V. IMPLICATIONS OF BURLINGTON
A. The Materially Adverse Standard
Creates Inverse Proportionality
Although the Court intended to protect alleged victims of
discrimination from an employer's retaliatory conduct, the effect of
the Court's holding will do the opposite. The Court's new standard
permits actions against employers where the retaliatory conduct is
"materially adverse" and "dissuade[s] a reasonable worker from
making or supporting a charge of discrimination." ' 9 However, as
Justice Alito argued in his concurrence, the degree of protection
granted to an employee is "inversely proportional to the severity of
"9130the original act of discrimination ....
A "reasonable employee" who suffers from severe
discrimination is less likely to be dissuaded from making a charge of
discrimination.1 3' By weighing the consequences of filing a charge
(possible retaliation) and not filing a charge (continual
discrimination), that employee will find it difficult not to file a
126. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2408 (2006).
127. Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239, 243 (1972) (internal citation omitted).
128. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).
129. Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2415.
130. See id. at 2421 (Alito, J., concurring).
131. Id.
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charge. 3 2 Thus, a reasonable employee in this situation would not be
dissuaded from making a discrimination charge no matter how
egregious the retaliatory behavior. As a result, even blatantly
retaliatory behavior would not be actionable because it would not
sufficiently dissuade a reasonable employee from filing a
discrimination claim.
On the other hand, an employee who suffers mild discrimination
will incur less benefit from filing a charge because the retaliatory
effects might outweigh the relief from discrimination.'33 Thus, under
this scheme of inverse proportionality, a reasonable employee in this
situation would be dissuaded from filing a discrimination charge,
satisfying the material adversity test.
These two examples demonstrate that the Court's reasonable
materiality standard creates an inversely proportional statutory
scheme that causes an adverse effect. Instead of providing greater
protection for employees who endure severe discrimination, the
Court's standard does the opposite by constructing a hurdle for anti-
retaliatory suits. By mechanically applying this new standard, courts
will impose upon employees a greater burden to prove retaliatory
conduct.
B. The Materially Adverse Standard
Might Open the Floodgates to Litigation
The objective reasonableness standard is highly problematic to
adjudicate. Despite the Court's reasoning that the objective standard
for material adversity is easier to administer and thus more certain,
the Court imposed an additional component to the general standard
that necessitates consideration of individual circumstances.'34 The
"particular circumstances" component establishes an intricate and
arduous standard, which makes it virtually impossible to enforce a
uniform and fair standard across the country. "' For instance, the
Court acknowledges that an employer's simple refusal to invite an
employee to lunch is non-retaliatory conduct.'36 However, if the
lunch was a weekly training session that would contribute to the
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 2415.
135. Contra id.
136. Id.
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employee's professional advancement, then it is materially adverse
since it might deter a reasonable employee from submitting a
discrimination claim.13 The Court gives another example where it
recognizes that a change in work schedule is trivial.13' However, if
the employee is a "young mother with school age children," it might
be material. 39 Thus, a single circumstance can transform a trivial
matter into a materially adverse action.
The preceding examples demonstrate that the Court's method of
determining objective reasonableness is unpredictable and
arbitrary. 140 Instead of using the reasonableness of an objective
person, the Burlington Court used the reasonableness of a person
with the individual characteristics of the employee.'4' If the courts
were open to considering every "particular circumstance," each court
would determine reasonableness based on its own subjective bias.
This arbitrary analysis would allow plaintiffs to conjure up any
rationale that would magnify their situation. In its illustrations, the
Court considers individual characteristics such as age, ambition,
gender, and family responsibilities.'42 Because the Burlington Court
does not provide clear guidelines on which individual characteristics
courts should consider, courts are left with an arbitrary and
capricious standard that can be contextualized and molded to suit the
plaintiff. As a result, courts have little guidance because the
Burlington Court does not distinguish what should be included or
excluded in an evaluation of a retaliation case.
A court can take the material adversity standard to extremes by
painstakingly combing through every single circumstance or by
quickly plowing through the general substance of the case without
prying into any details. There is little predictability of the
"materiality" of an action. Because of this, employers will walk on
eggshells as they try to circumvent any action that might constitute
retaliatory conduct.
Furthermore, the subjective, fact-specific nature of retaliation
claims will make courts reluctant to dismiss adverse employment
137. Id. at 2415-16.
138. Id. at 2415.
139. Id.
140. See id. at 2421 (Alito, J., concurring).
141. See id. at 2415.
142. Seeid. at2421.
THE EFFECT OF BURLINGTON
actions through summary judgment. The courts will more likely
permit the claims to go to trial before a jury. Not only does this
hinder judicial economy, it also produces a thorny situation for
employers. Ultimately, the problem trickles down to employees
since employers become arbiters of every petty employment dispute.
As long as claims are made in good faith, courts have even sustained
retaliation claims when the underlying discrimination claim was
dismissed. "'
The Burlington Court also did not delineate other guidelines,
such as the relevant interval of time between the filing of a complaint
and an alleged retaliatory act. Are employees immunized from
discipline or entitled to preferential treatment during that interval?
Since employers do not want to be subject to the whims of a jury,
they will not expose themselves to any action that might be deemed
retaliatory. Thus, employers might address performance issues
ahead of time or restrict favorable actions in order to avoid future
consequences. Additionally, employers might preempt a
discrimination or retaliation claim by aggressively dismissing a
troublesome employee because of fear of future reprisal.
In order to avoid retaliation claims under the new material
adversity standard, employers can reduce the chances of an adverse
employment claim by taking proactive steps. Employers can update
their employee handbooks and management policies to reflect an
anti-retaliation policy. In addition, employers can offer training
programs for supervisors to understand and prevent adverse
employment claims. Employers can also mitigate the risk of
retaliation claims by requiring employees to report any suspected
retaliatory behavior after a discrimination claim. As another
safeguard, employers can provide an independent review procedure
of any actions that can be deemed retaliatory.
However, these tactics come at a cost to the employer and
employee. They can be costly to implement, and the costs might
outweigh the benefits. Even if they are implemented, the vague and
indefinite holding of Burlington gives little incentive for employers
to take every precaution.
143. See, e.g., Pryor v. Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson, 212 F.3d 976, 980 (7th Cir.
2000).
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V. CONCLUSION
Due to an increase in the number of retaliation claims and the
circuits' different approaches towards Title VII adverse retaliatory
conduct, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
resolve the conflicting standards. By analyzing the anti-
discrimination and anti-retaliation provisions separately, the Court
created a material adversity standard that permits retaliation claims
for both employment- and nonemployment-related actions.
However, the Court should have used the in pari materia doctrine to
harmonize Title VII statutory language, which would establish that
the anti-retaliation provision only covers workplace-related actions.
Instead of seizing this opportunity to resolve the differences in the
circuits, the Court constructed a vague, subjective standard that
leaves courts and employers confused. By failing to delineate the
specifics of its material adversity standard, the Court created an
amorphous criterion that allows the courts and parties to subjectively
evaluate and contextually rationalize every case.
